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An independent resource on Kashmir for researchers, journalists, academics, and the curious.


November 2003: jammukashmir.net is back on-line and will be updated.  Apologies for the lapse over the summer.

 

Kashmir and the US attacks

The September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC have tremendous repurcussions, not just for the US and Afghanistan, but also for US foreign policy as a whole.  As a result, change can be expected to the environment in Kashmir.

A number of points are worth citing:

  • Militancy in Kashmir will become more difficult as Pakistan comes under serious pressure to end support for groups already on the US terrorist organisation list;
  • The Lashkar-e-Toiba, though it has denied any involvement in the US attacks, may find itself brought to task for its expression of solidarity with the Afghan state should the US attack Kabul;
  • The recent phase of so-called suicide bombings in Kashmir will be examined more closely, and there will be those who draw the wrong sort of conclusions from it;
  • The regime in Pakistan will pass through a turbulent period.  Pakistan could emerge with a different government; Islamist opposition to support for the US is bound to find a voice.  The US will commit to ensuring the stability of the Pakistani regime, and will take major steps to prevent a Taliban-style regime emerging;
  • The Kashmiri diaspora will find it more difficult to operate with ease, in particular when voicing support for militancy;
  • General international support for the APHC and self-determination in Kashmir is likely to dwindle; the stereotype of the militant Islamist will persist in the US and distort policy-making accordingly;
  • The regional balance of power in South Asia remains open to question.  Continuing US involvement in Pakistan / Afghanistan could alter the equation, and pause the growing defence friendship with India.  Expect, though, the economic interest in India to endure.

Related links:

Attack on America: Lasting impact on Kashmir, (Kashmir Observer, Srinagar,18 September 2001)

Bin Laden and Kashmir (Sunday Times, October 4, 1998)

Osama bin Laden in Pakistani Kashmir (September 24, 1999)

Musharraf, Bin Laden and the Lashkar (B.Raman, July 2001)

Bin Laden supports groups in J&K (February 2000)

Bin Laden's shadow looms over Kashmir (February 2000)

As you can see, most of the above are Indian news stories.  Once a deduction has been made for journalistic excess, it is still reasonable to assume that:

  • Bin Laden has contact with some Kashmiri militant groups, contact that has extended in the past to the offer of training and rhetorical support;
  • Some Kashmiri radicals look to Bin Laden as an example to follow;
  • India seeks to link militancy with Bin Laden, even if a concrete and permanent link is absent;
  • Nonetheless, greater understanding of the motives and links of Kashmiri militant groups is required.

September 16, 2001